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STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 




BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The record on appeal shows that on April 22, 1971, 
Deputy Tom World filed a complaint in City Court 
against the defendant Roy S. Ludlow for committing the 
crime of obstructing an officer in the discharge of his 
duty in violation of Title 76, Chapter 28, Section 54, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, (R. 69). 
A preliminary hearing was held on November 4, 1971. 
On January 6, 1972, defendant was bound over to District 
Court for trial. On January 27, 1972, an information was 
filed against defendant Ludlow by Jay E. Banks, Third 
District Attorney, alleging that (sic) on or about the 22nd 
2 
day of April, 1971, defendant did wilfully unlawfull 
. ' Y and 
knowmgly, delay, obstruct and resist a deputy sheriff. 
the discharge of his duty. m 
On February 10, defendant filed a Motion to Quash 
Information with Third District Court Judge Wilkins, and 
on March 27, 1972, Judge Wilkins handed down an order 
quashing the information. 
Plaintiff appeals from such Order. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
The issue in this case is a narrow one: Was there 
sufficient legal and factual basis to support the District 
Court's Order Quashing the Information in this case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff asks this Court to vacate the Order of the 
District Court quashing the information in this case and 
remand the case for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN THIS 
CASE WAS IN ERROR. 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT'S OFFENSE AR 0 SE 
FROM HIS REFUSAL TO PRESENT HIS 
EMPLOYEE TO THE PROCESS SERVER 
--
3 
SO THAT SERVICE OF PROCESS COULD 
BE MADE. 
POINT IL 
THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA PERMITS A PROCESS SERVER 
TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY, OTHER 
THAN PERSONAL DWELLINGS, TO SERVE 
CIVIL PROCESS. 
INTRODUCTION 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-23-3 (1953), spells out 
with particularity the grounds upon which an information 
may be quashed. In the case before the Court, the in-
formation was quashed on the grounds that" ... the com-
mon law of England and America does not afford the 
right of a civil process server to enter onto the private 
pl'operty of another for the purposes of serving the type 
and kind of civil process involved in the instant case ... " 
(R. 113). 
The State will show in this brief that the District 
Court's conclusion was in error for two reasons: first, the 
offense was committed when the defendant refused to 
produce his employee for the purpose of allowing a deputy 
sheriff to serve civil process upon the employee; and sec-
ond, the process server had the legal right to enter the 
defendant's property to serve civil process as long as that 
property was not a personal dwelling. 
4 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT'S OFFENSE AROSE 
FROM HIS REFUSAL TO PRESENT HIS 
EMPLOYEE TO THE PROCESS SERVER 
SO THAT SERVICE OF PROCESS COULD 
BE MADE. 
This court, in State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 , 
P. 2d 1060 (1955), clearly established the elements neces. 
sary to prove the offense of obstructing officers in the 
discharge of their duties (Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-54 
(1953)). In that case, this Court said: 
"In order to make out an offense under (Section 
76-28-54) . . . it must appear that (A) a duly 
constituted public officer (B) engaged in the per-
formance of an official duty (C) was obstructed 
or resisted by defendant." 286 P. 2d at 1062, 4 
Ut. 2d at 71-2. 
The District Court, Wilkins J., found that although 
all three elements presented in Sandman were stated in 
the information, the process server had no right to enter 
the defendant's property to serve civil process and there-
fore the defendant's obstruction was not a criminal offense. 
Counsel for defendant filed a lengthy memorandum, the 
relevant portions of which alleged that the deputy's at-
tempt to serve process was an unconstitutional search 
and seizure and that no authority allowed such process 
to be served on private property. 
The State submits that the Court was in error in 
granting the defendant's motion to quash the information. 
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Clearly, a question of search and seizure is not in-
volved in the instant case. At the preliminary hearing, 
the State made a proffer of proof in which it was repre-
sented to the court that a duly authorized deputy sheriff 
of Salt Lake County armed with valid civil process went 
to the defendant's place of business and asked the defen-
dant if he could see one of the defendant's employees so 
that he might serve that process upon her. Defendant 
refused to allow the deputy to see the employee (R. 15, 
16). 
It is the State's contention that the defendant's 
offense lies not in his refusal to allow the deputy to search 
through the premises of the factory for the employee, 
although as will be presented later, the deputy had that 
right, but the offense lies in the defendant-employer's re-
fusal to present his employee to the officer. The defen-
dant could have at least made an effort to determine (1) 
if the person whose name appears on the process was in-
deed one of his employees; (2) if the employee was pres-
ent on defendant's premises; and (3) if the employee 
would see the officer so that service could be made. If 
at that point, the employee would not see the officer and 
the defendant had refused to allow the officer to seek out 
the employee, we would then be confronted with the ques-
tion of search and seizure, entry on private property and 
the other arguments which prompted Judge Wilkins' 
decision. 
The State contends, howexer, that these other issues 
need not be reached by this Court. The offense of ob-
stmcting consists of defendant's absolute refusal t 
. . o pr0• 
duce his employee or even mform his employee of th 
officer's presence as presented in the information. Clearlye 
the tht.'ee elements of Sandman are present and th d' e e. 
fendant should be tried for the offense of obstructing ser. 
vice of process. In 58 Am. Jur. 2d, OBSTRUCTING 
JUSTICE, § 12, it is poL.1ted out that the term "obstruct" 




" ... includes any passive, indirect, circuitous im-
pediments to the service or execution of process ' 
such as hindering or preventing an officer by not 
opening a door or removing an obstacle, or by con. 
1 
cealing or removing property." 
The St2.te does not ask this Court to determine the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant in this case. Such a 
determination is the province of the trier of fact in the 
lower court. The State merely asks this Court to vacate 
the District Court's order quashing the information in 
this case and to allow the State to put on its evidence. 
The elements of the crime as delineated in Sandman are , 
clearly present in the information, and the order quashing 
the information was therefore improper. 
Defendant's motion to quash was based upon the 
fact that the information "does not charge the defendant 
with the commission of an offense" (R. 108). The infor· 
mation states the elements necessary for the offense, (R. 
107) and if the defendant has a defense, such defense 
1 
should be presented to the trier of fact. The State con· 
tends, however, that an order quashing the infonnation 
7 
in this case is improper when the grounds for such order 
are th1t the information fails to make out an offense. 
The ddendant further asserted in his Amended Order 
to Quash I:iformation (R. 108) that " ... the information 
contains a statement of matter which constitutes a legal 
bar to the prosecution of th::: defendant", and he refers 
specifically to the fact that " ... the information fails to 
s::t fcdh that the deruty sheriff was acting under color 
cf a lav,,rfully issued search warrant, and therefore the 
information contains a statement of a matter which con-
stitute:; a legal bar to prosecution ... ". 
The defendant, however, fails to assert at any point 
in the lower court proceedings that the deputy sheriff 
needed to search warrant in order for the defendant to be 
required to produce his employee so that process could 
be served. The State's position is that the deputy did 
not need a search warrant to seek out the employee, a 
matter which will be dealt with in Point II of this brief, 
and the State can see no reasoning which would require 
a search warrant before an employer can be required to 
at least inform his employee of the presence of an officer 
or even produce the employee for the officer. The defen-
dant at no time produced evidence or reasoning on this 
particular point. 
On the other hand, the defendant seemed preoccu-
pied in the lower court proceedings with the concept that 
" ... the deputy sheriff sought to go beyond the business 
office area of the defendant's plant, and into the privacy 
of his working area ... " (R. 50). It is plaintiff's conten-
8 
tion that the offense took place in the business office area 
of defendant's plant, where any member of the public ~ 
an invitee. The State presented no evidence which would 
show that the deputy tried to go beyond the business area 
or even desired to do so. Rather, such steps ne2d not have 
been taken if the defendant would have at least asked 
the employee if she would see the deputy. The defen. 
dant's offense, as stated earlier, lies not in a refusal 1:o 
allow the officer to search through his plant for the em. 
ployee, but in his refusal to even inform the employee of 
the officer's presence and/or produce the employee for the 
officer. 
Whether allegation of such conduct constitutes an 
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-54 (1953), was 
answered by this Court in State v. Sandman, supra, when 
it said: 
"Such interference or resistance need not be in the 
form of physical force or violence, but it is suffi. 
cient that there be some direct action amounting 
to affirmative interference." 4 Utah 2d at 72, 286 
P. 2d at 1062. 
POINT II. 
THE COI\1MON LAW OF ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA PERMITS A PROCESS SERVER 
TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY, OTHER 
THAN PERSONAL DWELLINGS, TO SERVE 
CIVIL PROCESS. 
There is little question but what a process server, 
attempting to serve civil process cannot enter a personal 
dwelling with or without a search warrant. For that rea-
son, Utah law allows service of civil process " ... by leav-
inG" a copy of (the person's) usual place of abode with 
some person of suitable age and discretion there residing 
... " UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, RULE 4(e) (1) (1953). 
iv1ost of the defendant's argument in the lower court 
proceedings revolve around the failure of the information 
to all2ge that the deputy acted under color of a search 
wanant. The argument is ludicrous, simply because an 
examination of Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-2 (1953), reveals 
that search warrants may be issued only when a public 
offense is involved and not in a civil situation. 
The questions then, is not whether a search warrant 
was required in the instant case, but whether a deputy 
can go upon private property other than a personal dwell-
ing to serve civil process. As stated previously, the State 
does not quarrel with the defendant's arguments that a 
process server cannot enter a dwelling to serve civil pro-
cess, however, the State does urge that when private prop-
erty other than a dwelling is involved the process server 
has every right to enter reasonably and peaceably to serve 
process. 
Statutory authority for this concept is provided by 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953), which provides: 
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"The common law of England so far as it · 
t to . n· . 18 not repugnan '. or m con ict \V1th, the Constitution o: laws o.f this State, and so far only as it is con. 
s~tent d""'.1t~h andfadhisapted to the natural and physi. 
c con I 10ns o t "' state and the nece:cc:ities of 
the people her~f is. hereby adopted, and shnll be 
the rule of dec1s1on m all courts of this state.' 
The State contends that the common law of both 
England and America permit a process server to enter 
upon property other than a dwelling to serve civil process. 
The defendant's authorities, presented to the District 
Court in memoranda, primarily go to the point that a 
process server cannot enter a dwelling house to serve civil 
process. The few cases concerning businesses relate to 
inspection and regulatory procedures from which criminal 
complaints could arise. e.g. See v. Seattle, (R. 37). Such 
is not the situation in the instant case. The defendant 
presumably was not opening himself up to prosecution by 
presenting the employee to the officer, nor would he have 
done so if he had allowed the officer to find the employee. 
The State admits public policy dictates that where 
possible criminal violations are involved, greater safe· 
guards are necessary; but where, as in the instant case, 
no criminal violations could presumably be involved, pub-
lic policy should dictate that an individual cannot, on 
property other than dwellings, obstruct an officer in the 
performance of his duty. 
Such policy was indeed the common law of England. 
In 57 A. L. R. 220, it is pointed out that: 
11 
"The privilege which the law allows to a man's 
habitation, and which precludes the sheriff from 
entering, unless the outer door is open, either to 
arrest the man or to take his goods on execution, 
does not extend to a store or barn disconnected 
from the dwelling house, and forming no part of 
the curtilage. (Citing cases.) " 
In Hodder v. Williams, 2 Q. B. (ENG.) 663, it was 
held that: "A sheriff, for the purpose of levying 
under a writ of fieri facias, may break open the 
outer door of a workshop or other building of the 
judgment debtor, not being his dwelling house or 
connected therewith." Reported at 57 A. L. R. 221. 
The C'.)mmon law of America appears to have de-
veloped al-:mg the saa'.e lines in this area as has the com-
mon law of England. In Platt v. Brown, XVI PICK. 553 
(MASS.) (1835), the sheriff attempted to serve civil pro-
cess, i.e. writ of attachment, on goods in the possession 
of a third person. The Court upheld the sheriff's right 
to enter the warehouses in which the third person's goods 
were stored and attach the goods by taking possession of 
them. XVI PICK. at 554. 
Although later case law relating to the specific point 
in question appears to be lacking, there is little doubt 
that the common law of both England and America per-
mit an officer in the discharge of his duties to enter prem-
ises other than a dwelling to serve civil process. The 
rationale is as valid today as it was in earlier times. Where 
civil process is involved, public policy requires that no 
individual, or goods as the case may be, should be able 
to avoid execution of process. In the case of personal ser-
vice at a person's place of abode, substituted service is 
12 
available by law; but where an individual is else h 
. . . Were 
than m a dwellmg, substituted service is not available 
and the law must have some manner of serving civil pro. 
cess in that situation. The common law, adopted in Utah 
by § 68-3-1, provides such manner of serving civil process 
and an information alleging the obstruction of such ser'. 
vice is valid for it clearly makes out an offense as provided 
in § 76-28-54. 
The AmeriC.'.1ll Law Institute, which provides for mod. 
em codification of the common law through its Rest.ate. 
ment Series, has drawn the same conclusions as presented 
by the plaintiff in this case. In Restatement of Torts 
' Second, Section 209, the American Law Institute has 
codified the common law of England and America as pre-
sented in this Part: 
"§ 209. ENTRY TO EXECUTE CIVIL PRO-
CESS AGAINST NONOCCUPANT OF 
LAND 
(1) The privilege to execute civil process pursu- 1 
ant to a writ which is either valid or fair on its 
face carries with it the privilege to enter land in 
the possession of another, for the purpose of exe· . 
cuting such process against the person or g~ds of 
a third person not an occupant of the land, if the 
person or goods subject to process are on the land 
or the possessor of the land has led the actor rea· 
sonably to believe that such is the case." 
The Restatement would modify the common law only ro 1 
the extent that an actor is not privileged to break and 
enter a dwelling except in certain proscribed circum· 
stances which even the common law did not recognize. 
13 
CONCLUSION 
The State would again reiterate that it is not the 
province of this Court or the District Court on a Motion 
to Quash Information, to determine the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. Plaintiff merely asks this Court to 
reverse the decision of the Di.strict Court by finding that 
the information below specified the commission of an 
offense and made no statement which would be a legal 
bar to prosecution, thereby allowing the people of the 
State of Utah a fair hearing as to the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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